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/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, Vol. I, 8/10/62-8/16/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "this memo & 2 tabs sent 8/11/62 for Pres. wkend reading."
3. The only chance the plan has for success is to accompany it with notice to Ben-Gurion that we will guarantee the security of Israel and provide Hawk missiles. It is suggested that we give Nasser an opportunity to agree to an arms limitation before making the final decision to provide Israel with Hawks. I agree that this is desirable in terms of its possible long-run impact but it is highly unlikely that Nasser would agree to any such limitation. We should not, in the meantime, defer for too long our offer to Ben-Gurion, for I should like to be in the position of notifying him that we will provide Hawks at the time we request his acquiescence in the Johnson plan.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/8-1562. Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, but presumably it was prepared by Robert C. Strong. It is attached to an August 15 memorandum from Dutton to Talbot (see the source note, Document 19). This meeting was a continuation of the one recorded in Document 19, which the President left at 5:35 p.m.
2) Since your departure, Johnson has refined his letter of transmittal which you will recall was in draft when you left. Revised text now contains following paragraph which we believe will meet the Prime Minister's concern, since it would enable operations under the Plan to be brought to halt if UAR were found to be conducting propaganda designed pressure refugees into choosing repatriation.
In the middle of this discussion she told me she had just received concrete evidence that Egyptians have guided missiles which they had purchased from West German sources at a cost of 250,000,000 pounds sterling. This, she said, indicated their real intentions. Under the circumstances I recommend that we defer a final decision on the Johnson plan until I return Thursday night.
Having explored preliminary reactions on one side without meeting rejection, we think similar exploration should be carried out on other. By these we not necessarily committed finally to proceed with Johnson Plan at this time. Rather, we will have facts on which this Government can determine whether worthwhile commit US to Plan and attempt proceed its implementation.
Nasser's response moderate and slightly encouraging. He stated that in discussion with Johnson he had objected to proposed quota figure of 20,000 for Israeli repatriation and was glad to know that whole quota idea now dropped. His objection quota that it would result in making Arabs continuing minority in Israel with typical minority problems already enhanced by second class treatment Arabs now living in Israel. If refugees told that only 20,000--or any other modest figure--could return Israel they would naturally vote against repatriation. Nasser then stated that final solution refugees could come only when majority allowed to return to own homes thus making Israel into a binational state with Arab group large enough to ensure equality of rights and treatment. He recognized that this would strike at basic Zionist concept and might take "70 years" to accomplish.
GOF has received through its representative on PCC a draft of Plan for settlement Arab refugee problem [Plan?] evolved after more than one year of highly skillful, quiet diplomatic endeavor by the Conciliation Commission Special Representative, Dr. Johnson. Highest levels USG have examined Plan and consider it best that could be devised in the difficult circumstances surrounding this problem. We are convinced the effort should be made, we believe there is some chance of its succeeding and we see no reasonable alternative. However, there would also be advantages even if it were to fail, for the entire problem and host of UNGA resolutions concerning it could then be re-examined in a new light. We feel there is an urgency in this. If a small start on questioning process Dr. Johnson proposes can be made prior to debate on this matter at the General Assembly (which we would hope to defer until late in the session), our respective tasks in dealing with an abrasive, difficult item will be greatly eased in that we could point to a useful process under way and seek support for its continuation rather than being drawn into prolonged futile discussion of likely Arab and Israeli proposals which can have no useful effect. Additionally, there would be merit in having Johnson's proposals under implementation so that we could avoid a debate on their specifics in the GA, which we are convinced would result in their rejection. We hope GOF, which has cooperated most helpfully in PCC context since start of this initiative, will be able approve Plan and give it GOF support. We understand Dr. Johnson would like to submit Plan to PCC at a meeting to be convened for this purpose on August 31. We think it would be helpful if, after that meeting Johnson were to hand Plan to parties and begin discussions of it with them. In this way, Plan's consideration by Israel and its four neighbors and by PCC would proceed concurrently. This has advantages in that PCC would not be put in position of approving Plan to find it was later summarily rejected by the parties. We believe GOF might find it useful review with us at the working level some of the implications of the Plan. To facilitate this review we have asked Ambassador Stevenson to dispatch Robert Blake to Paris tonight. Blake is the member of USUN who is most fully conversant with its implications as we see them. FYI: While we would regret French reluctance approve Plan, our minimum first objective with them now should be to get their acquiescence that Plan be given to parties. End FYI.
384. Arab refugees. FYI: On August 31 Palestine Conciliation Commission Special Representative Johnson presented to PCC his Plan for solution Arab refugee problem. By prearrangement PCC deferred final approval of Plan but authorized Johnson present it to host governments and Israel without publicity or negotiation on details. He will explain how Plan meets particular concerns of each state in hope that their reactions will not be such as preclude (a) Plan's formal adoption by PCC at further early meeting and (b) subsequent initiation of first steps in Plan implementation in order that these may be well under way by time UNGA debates PalRef item (probably in November).
Addressees (except Jerusalem to which copy pouched) have received drafts of Johnson's Letter of Transmittal, "The Plan", "Explanation", "Notice", "Questionnaires", "Considerations for US" and "Action Sequence". After August 31 meeting, Johnson will give parties only "The Plan". Details of Plan premises and operation as contained in other related documents will be subject of oral discussion by Johnson with parties, and existence of other documents should not be revealed.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Iran 381 (TS) 3 Aug 62. Secret. Another copy indicates the letter was drafted by Miklos (NEA/GTI) and cleared with Kettelhut (NEA/NR) and Russell (NEA). (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/8-3162)
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 8/61-9/62. Secret; Noforn. No drafting information appears on the source text. The memorandum was received in the National Security Council at 3:18 p.m. on September 14.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Jordan, 4/62-10/62. No classification marking. An earlier draft of this letter was forwarded to McGeorge Bundy on September 8 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck, which noted, among other points, that Jordan's attitude toward the Johnson Plan was of equal importance to that of Israel and the United Arab Republic, because more than half of the Palestinian refugees resided in Jordan. It also noted that the United States retained some leverage with Jordan because of large-scale U.S. economic assistance. A marginal notation on Brubeck's memorandum indicates that the original of the memorandum was directed to Feldman on September 8. The attached draft letter shows changes in Komer's handwriting. (Ibid.) The text of the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Amman for delivery in telegram 116, September 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/9-1462) 2b1af7f3a8